



A new apartheid? The spatial implications of fear of crime in Cape Town, South Africa⁽¹⁾

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1. This article provides an updated and shortened version of my MSc dissertation, undertaken between 2000 and 2001 at the Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) of the London School of Economics. Thanks are due to my supervisor at the time, Dr Dennis Rodgers, for his advice and support during that year and in subsequent years. See Spinks, Charlotte (2001), "A new apartheid? Urban spatiality, (fear of) crime, and segregation in Cape Town, South Africa", Working Paper 01-20, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, 42 pages. (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP20.pdf>)

2. Academic research addresses America in particular – see, for

SUMMARY: *This paper examines the fear of crime in post-apartheid South Africa and its impact on urban space and form, focusing in particular on Cape Town. South African statistics point to alarming increases in serious crime over recent years and, although such statistics are considered unreliable, reflecting to some extent increases in the rate of crime reporting, the public perception is nonetheless one of decreased security. Attempts to mitigate fear have resulted increasingly in the creation of fortified enclaves and a withdrawal from public space. Although the more extreme manifestations are restricted to affluent areas, levels of residential protection have increased among all groups. As in other parts of the world, this "architecture of fear" results in growing danger within the public domain and the increasing polarization of social groups. The paper argues that this trend in South Africa perpetuates the social divisions that were inherent in the apartheid state into the post-apartheid context, with the fear of crime being used as a justification for a predominantly racist fear of difference.*

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS ARTICLE ADDRESSES the impact of the fear of crime on residential urban form in post-apartheid South Africa, focusing specifically on Cape Town. The effect of fear and insecurity on urban space and form is a crucial issue facing urban citizens and policy makers across the world,⁽²⁾ but in South Africa its implications for re-creating a new form of apartheid render it a critical area of inquiry. Drawing on a 1998 crime survey undertaken in Cape Town,⁽³⁾ the location and nature of this fear are identified and discussed. The analysis addresses citizen responses to fear, such as the fortification of houses across all race and socioeconomic groups and the move towards gated communities for the wealthy. This article argues that citizen responses lead to increased segregation and a "new apartheid" that bears frightening similarities to old apartheid structures. It also considers whether citizen fortification is a response to factors other than fear of crime.

Fear of crime is spatially, socially and temporally distributed. Citizens seek to alleviate this fear and mitigate the incidence of crime by providing a sense of protection via urban form (e.g. walls protecting residences) and altered lifestyle (e.g. restricted spatial movement, limited social interaction). Although this article primarily addresses the spatial responses, these clearly have an impact on lifestyle. This form of risk management,

in which individuals assess risk and modify behaviour and urban form to eliminate fear and minimize crime, has been aptly described as the “architecture of fear”.⁽⁴⁾ While historic responses to urban fear and insecurity have been largely state-led, in recent years, fear management has been increasingly (although not exclusively) driven by *private* forces (including individual citizens). This paper analyzes citizen responses to the climate of crime in post-apartheid Cape Town, emphasizing their negative impact on urban life and public order, and questioning the “real” motives behind them. Essentially, the paper argues that citizen responses to insecurity in Cape Town are recreating a city of divisions that exhibits remarkable similarities to the apartheid city.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

FEAR HAS ALWAYS played a role in urban form, influencing urban planning, residential design and the spatial distribution of citizens. Indeed, Jeremy Bentham’s classic “panoptic” prison design, which allowed permanent anonymous surveillance of prisoners, strongly influenced numerous social engineering and design projects. Historically, the pre-modern city constructed walls and gates to exclude undesirables and thereby minimize fear, while the modern city was created in response to fear of those already inside the walls. Baron Haussman’s nineteenth century Parisian reconstruction famously “boulevardized” the city, displacing and fragmenting the feared revolutionary threat posed by the underclass. Although postwar modernist planners such as Le Corbusier subsequently sought to destroy streets, eliminating fear remained the primary motive, albeit via artificially “pure” environments. More recently, both Jane Jacobs’ and Oscar Newman’s approaches oppose this sterile modernist drive, seeking to decrease fear via natural surveillance and defensible space, respectively. For Jacobs, dense, busy areas have more “eyes on the streets”, which facilitates “almost unconscious networks” of natural surveillance, in contrast to the sterile pedestrian zones of modernist planning.⁽⁵⁾ Newman’s architectural concept of “defensible space” builds on Jacobs’ belief in using spatial design to encourage citizens’ mutual responsibility, by establishing a sense of “territory” and “natural surveillance” through residential building design.⁽⁶⁾ However, in recent years, such state-led planning strategies to mitigate fear and insecurity in the city have been usurped increasingly by private, individual citizen responses. This has become the norm in urban South Africa, where a climate of fear pervades everyday life.

III. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICA has encountered numerous social engineering projects (e.g. colonialism, apartheid, democratization), apartheid’s legacy is particularly deep. Indeed, overcoming this inherited social and spatial structure is South Africa’s modern challenge. Apartheid literally means “apart-ness”; lines were drawn on maps and people re-ordered accordingly. At the urban level, apartheid established race-based residential segregation. In the apartheid city, the *spatial* distancing of blacks to urban peripheries reflected and facilitated *social* distancing from whites, who were allocated large central areas of land.⁽⁷⁾

In analyzing the motivations behind Cape Town’s long history of urban

example, Davis, Mike (1992), “Beyond blade runner: urban control – the ecology of fear”, *Open Magazine* pamphlet series No 23, Open Media, New Jersey; also Dillon, D (1994), “Fortress America”, *Planning*, June, pages 8–12. Also Brazil – see, for example, Caldeira, Teresa (1999), “Fortified enclaves: the new urban segregation” in Holston, James (editor), *Cities & Citizenship*, Duke University Press, London, pages 114–138; also Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and D Hoffman (1998), “Brazilian apartheid: street kids and the struggle for urban space” in Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and Carolyn Sargent (editors), *Small Wars: The Cultural Politics of Childhood*, University of California Press, Berkeley, pages 352–388.

3. The survey was conducted by the Institute for Security Studies and asked experiential (direct victimization) and perceptual (sense of safety) questions to a representative sample (6,000 respondents) of Cape Town residents, and forms the basis for subsequent analysis. See Camerer, Lala, Antoinette Louw, Mark Shaw, Lillian Artz and Wilfried Scharf (1998), “Crime in Cape Town: results of a city victim survey”, ISS monograph series No 23, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 135 pages.

4. Agbola, Tunde (1997), *Architecture of Fear: Urban Design and Construction in Response to Urban Violence in Lagos*, IFRA, African Book Builders, Ibadan, Nigeria, 136 pages.

5. Jacobs, Jane (1961), *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, Vintage Books, New York, 458 pages.

6. Newman, Oscar (1972), *Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City*, Architectural Press, London, 264 pages.

7. The official apartheid racial classifications of

white (European), Black (African), coloured (mixed heritage) and Indian (Asian descent) are used because they continue to reflect general socioeconomic inequalities. Black (upper case) refers only to Africans, whereas black (lower case) includes all non-whites.

8. Swanson, Maynard W (1977), "The sanitation syndrome: bubonic plague and urban native policy in the Cape colony 1900-1909", *Journal of African History* Vol 18, pages 390-410.

9. Robinson, Jennifer (1992), "Power, space and the city: historical reflections on apartheid and post-apartheid urban orders", in Smith, David (editor) *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanisation and Social Change in South Africa*, Routledge, London, pages 292-302.

10. Mabin, Alan (1995), "On the problems and prospects of overcoming segregation and fragmentation in Southern Africa's cities in the postmodern era" in Watson, Sophie and Katherine Gibson (editors), *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, Blackwell, London, pages 187-198.

11. The use of the term "other" throughout this article draws on Edward Said's notion of "other" as an invented concept, in which one social group constructs the identity of the "other" social group only in relation to themselves rather than as a separate entity. In Said's case, this was the "invention" of the East (or the "Orient") by the West, with the "East" comprising what is opposite and inferior ("other") to the West. The understanding of "other" exists only for the group that creates such a label. In this paper, it is the creation by (largely white) wealthy South Africans of an "other" label to describe the (largely black) poor majority. See Said, Edward (1978),

segregation, Swanson's orthodox "sanitation syndrome" explaining Black segregation as a measure to curb the spread of disease is no longer universally accepted.⁽⁸⁾ New research indicates that this health justification is a pretext for alternative motives, such as state power⁽⁹⁾ or economic interests.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, racist fear of "other"⁽¹¹⁾ remains the salient motivation, whether disguised as spatial quarantine, political sovereignty, fear of commercial competition, protection of property prices or the securing of business land. Indeed, this fear of "difference" formed the crux of popular phrases used to justify apartheid, such as *swart gevaar* (Black danger) and *skollie menace* (scoundrel coloureds). As demonstrated later, such motives continue to dominate sociospatial exclusions in Cape Town, ten years after the demise of apartheid.

Located on Africa's southwestern tip, Cape Town is South Africa's oldest urban settlement (founded in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company) and third largest city (after Johannesburg and Durban). Cape Town is unique in many ways, in particular in its non-Black-dominated demographics (until very recently, coloureds were the majority population group in Cape Town, closely followed by whites), almost total segregation under apartheid, and a pre-apartheid tradition of relative racial tolerance and integration not found in South Africa's other cities. However, despite Cape Town's demographic history as dominated by a white and coloured rather than Black African population, recent indications that "Africa is coming to the Cape" are radically altering Cape Town society.⁽¹²⁾ Indeed, results from the 2001 census indicate that, while the coloured population continues to be Cape Town's largest single group (48 per cent), the Black population is expanding rapidly (from 25 per cent in 1996 to 31.5 per cent in 2001), with a corresponding decline in the proportion of the white population (from 21 per cent in 1996 to 19 per cent in 2001).⁽¹³⁾ Thus, Cape Town is now dominated by coloureds and Blacks, rather than coloureds and whites. As discussed later, these changes in Cape Town's demography have increased fears among residents, particularly among whites.

Since the fall of apartheid in the late 1980s, the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa has undergone radical social transformation. However, post-apartheid Cape Town continues to exhibit ruthless spatial polarization, dominated by the juxtaposition of centrally located affluent suburbs and economic centres alongside poverty-stricken and overcrowded settlements on the city edges. Despite various government interventions to overcome this spatial inheritance, the apartheid legacy appears "embedded" in people's "institutional and social practices", facilitating "broad continuity with the past rather than any transformation".⁽¹⁴⁾ As this article demonstrates, much of this continued apartheid-style segregation is fuelled by a fear-of-crime rhetoric.

a. Crime in urban South Africa

The end of apartheid, democratization and majority rule were optimistically anticipated to end the violence of South Africa's 1980s armed struggle. However, since 1990, a new form of urban panic has engulfed South Africa, focusing on criminal activity rather than political insurgency, and spreading into previously protected white suburbs. This article addresses the normalized everyday nature of property and personal crime in Cape Town. The dominance of these two crime types in South Africa is confirmed by

the 1998 Cape Town crime survey: property crimes are most common (47.2 per cent of crimes), followed by violent personal crimes (16.8 per cent). Both types of crime encourage fear and insecurity, often related to specific urban spaces and social groups.

South Africa clearly hosts severe crime, yet crime statistics are considered unreliable, dependent as they are on police recording and victim/witness reporting. This is aggravated by historic mistrust of a police force that previously functioned as a brutal government enforcer rather than a citizens' protector. The 2000–2001 moratorium on crime statistics (during which the government banned releasing crime statistics, arguing that errors reduced reliability) further hampered public confidence. Despite the lack of faith in these statistics, crime figures, augmented by crime surveys, are used here to discern *general* crime trends.

Following the lifting of the moratorium on crime statistics after legal action by the media, figures released in 2001 revealed horrific increases in serious crime between 1994 and 2000.⁽¹⁵⁾ In particular, residential burglary (property crime) increased by 16.6 per cent and rape (violent personal crime) by 9.4 per cent,⁽¹⁶⁾ although the latter possibly indicates an increase in reporting rather than in crime *per se*. The most recent figures (January–December 2002) indicate that although violent crime is decreasing, robbery and residential burglary (violent or otherwise) have increased.⁽¹⁷⁾ In the Western Cape Province (dominated by Cape Town), levels of residential burglary have increased dramatically, by 62.1 per cent between 1994 and 2002.⁽¹⁸⁾ Although some increases are attributed to a rise in reporting since 1994, crime increases are confirmed by the 2003 national victim survey undertaken by the Institute of Security Studies.⁽¹⁹⁾ According to the survey, almost one-quarter (22.9 per cent) of South Africans had been victims of crime in the preceding year, predominantly property crime, with the Western Cape (dominated by Cape Town) hosting "...both the worst and the fastest growing crime situation in the country."⁽²⁰⁾ Despite reductions in some crime levels, one-third of crimes in South Africa are violent, more than double the corresponding value in the USA,⁽²¹⁾ indicating South Africa's extreme violence.

These limited statistics are sufficient to confirm South Africa, and specifically Cape Town, as crime-ridden, but impact is not uniform, varying even *within* Cape Town according to social group and spatial area. Although crime affects all South Africans, the "...threat of victimization ... is determined by where individuals live and work,"⁽²²⁾ and apartheid's sociospatial legacy ensures that crime remains concentrated in poor black social groups and spaces. According to the 1998 Cape Town crime survey, white suburbs experience less crime per capita than black areas, but are disproportionately affected by property crime (40 per cent of crimes against whites are burglary). In contrast, black areas host both property crime (25 per cent of crimes) and high violent personal crime (34 per cent of crimes against blacks are murder or assault). Although it is unsurprising that those who are comparatively wealthier are most vulnerable to property crime, the divergent sociospatial experience is significant. This is aggravated by apartheid's skewed sociospatial distribution of personal and institutional resources. For example, despite lower crime rates in former white areas, they host the majority of police stations,⁽²³⁾ and inhabitants are more protected by infrastructure (e.g. private cars, street lighting) and better able to afford private security. In contrast, poorer blacks inhabit areas with weak "defensible space" (e.g. no street lighting or tele-

Orientalism, Routledge, London, 368 pages.

12. Western, John (2001), "Africa is coming to the Cape", *The Geographical Review* Vol 91, No 4, pages 617–640.

13. 1996 and 2001 census statistics from: Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (1998), *Census South Africa: Community Profiles 1996*, Stats SA, Pretoria; also Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) (2003), *Census South Africa: Community Profiles 2001*, Stats SA, Pretoria. Both can be accessed using: SuperTABLE 4.2 © 1993–2003 Space–Time Research Pty Ltd, Melbourne, Australia (<http://www.str.com.au>)

14. Turok, Ivan (2001), "Persistent polarisation post-apartheid? Progress towards urban integration in Cape Town", *Urban Studies* Vol 38, No 13, pages 2349–2377, citation from page 2350.

15. 1994 is used as a base year for comparison because the South African Police Service (SAPS) began releasing comprehensive and reliable crime statistics at national and local levels in that year.

16. Kane-Berman, John (2001), "No major changes in crime trends", *Fast Facts* No 7, South African Institute of Race Relations, page 1.

17. Leggett, Ted (2003), "The facts behind the figures: crime statistics 2002/3", *SA Crime Quarterly* No 6, December, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 5 pages.

18. South African Police Service (SAPS) (2003), "South African crime statistics released on 22 September 2003", *Criminal Justice Monitor*, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. (www.iss.co.za/CJM/stats0903/index.htm)

19. A representative sample of 4,862 adults (aged over

16) were interviewed. This is South Africa's second national victim survey, the first having been conducted in 1998. See Omar, Bilkis (2004), "Crime and safety in South Africa: release of the 2003 national victim survey results", presented at the seminar "Is South Africa Safer than in 1998? The ISS 2003 National Victim Survey Provides Some Answers", 3 March, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. (www.iss.co.za/Seminars/2004/0303sanvs.htm)

20. See reference 17, page 5.

21. Landman, Karina and Martin Schönteich (2002), "Urban fortresses: gated communities as a reaction to crime", *African Security Review* Vol 11, No 4.

22. Shaw, Mark and P Gastrow (2001), "Stealing the show? Crime and its impact in post-apartheid South Africa", *Daedalus* Vol 130, No 1, pages 235–258, citation from pages 243–244. Although age, gender and socioeconomic status also determine victimization, this article predominately addresses sociospatial determinants.

23. In 1996, 75 per cent of all police stations were in former white areas. See Budlender, Debbie (2000), "Human development" in May, Julian (editor), *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Meeting the Challenge*, David Philip, Cape Town, pages 97–104.

24. Gordon, D (1998), "Crime in the new South Africa", *The Nation* Vol 267, No 15, November, pages 17–21, figures from page 17.

25. May, Julian, Christopher Rogerson and A Vaughan (2000), "Livelihoods and assets", in May (2000), see reference 23, pages 229–256, citation from page 254.

26. See reference 19, Omar (2004).

27. See reference 19, Omar (2004).

phones, abandoned open spaces), are poorly policed and cannot afford private security. This spatial distribution of victimization and resources strongly affects fear of crime.

b. Fear of crime in Cape Town

Despite South Africa's long history of crime, its increasing visibility in previously protected (white) areas and the increased media coverage of all areas has fuelled public anxieties. In a 1994 public opinion survey, only 6 per cent of respondents viewed crime as a major concern, yet, by 1997, this had risen to 58 per cent.⁽²⁴⁾ This increase is significantly above the relative rise in crime rates, representing the growth of post-apartheid fear of crime. Although growth in fear is predominately concentrated among whites, fear of crime is not confined solely to wealthy white suburbs, and "...[poor] settlements ... are [equally] permeated by fear."⁽²⁵⁾

The emotional nature of the fear of crime renders measurement problematic; for instance, asking questions about fear increases anxiety among respondents, and specific groups, such as men, tend to underacknowledge fear. Despite the inadequacies of crime surveys, the 1998 Cape Town victim survey is drawn on here. According to this survey, the vast majority of residents (77 per cent) believe crime has increased since 1994, with fear of crime based on temporal and sociospatial factors. While virtually all whites (95 per cent) feel "very" and "fairly" safe in their daytime residential areas, only just over half of Blacks (52 per cent) and coloureds (56 per cent) feel this way. Fear is most stark at night, when very few Blacks (11.9 per cent) and coloureds (9 per cent) feel safe in their residential areas, as opposed to half of whites (51 per cent). These figures are confirmed by actual levels of victimization, for while most (79.2 per cent) white victimization occurs away from their residential areas, most Black (51 per cent) and coloured (55 per cent) victimization occurs in their residential areas. This racial divergence reflects the different individual and institutional resources noted above, a legacy of apartheid geography. Indeed, while coloureds and Blacks believe that their historic group areas and informal settlements, respectively, are South Africa's primary crime sites, whites fear the city centre rather than their residential areas. All groups demonstrate fear, but while white fears focus beyond neighbourhood boundaries, blacks fear their immediate surroundings. Furthermore, despite general declines in crime rates since 1998, the majority of South Africans (53 per cent) believe crime has increased. Pessimism is strongest among urban residents and minority population groups (Indian and white).⁽²⁶⁾

Although the 1998 Cape Town crime victim survey is now six years out of date, no subsequent survey has been undertaken in Cape Town. However, a national crime victim survey was undertaken in 2003.⁽²⁷⁾ In the past, Cape Town has always exhibited much higher levels of fear and insecurity than the nation as a whole (for example, in 1998 only one-quarter of Capetonians (28 per cent) felt "very safe" in their daytime residential area compared to almost two-thirds (60 per cent) in the nation as a whole). Thus, trends identified by the 2003 national survey will need to be adjusted for Cape Town. Although the 2003 national survey indicates similar sociospatial and temporal fears as previous studies, South Africans now exhibit significantly greater insecurity. Only one-quarter of all South Africans now feel "very safe" in their daytime residential area (compared to almost two-thirds in 1998), and well over half feel "very unsafe" in their night-time residential area (whereas only one-quarter felt this way in

1998). Given previous trends, these responses are likely to be magnified in Cape Town. Indeed, given that crime levels are disproportionately high in Western Cape Province, and that, in 1998, levels of fear in Cape Town were much higher than national levels, it is anticipated that fear of crime in Cape Town is now significantly higher than indicated by either the 1998 Cape Town crime victim survey or the 2003 national survey.

Having identified the magnitude of crime and fear of crime in modern Cape Town, our analysis now turns to the nature and form of citizens' residential responses to this fear.

IV. CITIZEN RESPONSES TO SOCIOSPATIAL FEAR OF CRIME

IN THE ABSENCE of apartheid urban controls, alongside escalating crime, fear of crime and a lack of confidence in the "new" government, citizens are responding independently by fortifying their properties, taking extreme measures in some cases. While the more intense manifestations, such as gated communities, are confined to the affluent, fear-provoked residential fortification is common to both poor and wealthy, albeit in different guises.

Although the 1998 Cape Town crime survey indicates that the majority of Blacks (92 per cent) and coloureds (87 per cent) have no form of residential protection, as opposed to a minority (30 per cent) of whites, more recent research suggests that since 1998, Cape Town has become increasingly security-conscious,⁽²⁸⁾ and levels of residential protection across all population groups are likely to have risen. Furthermore, the 2003 national crime survey reveals such a significant decrease in perceptions of safety with regard to residential areas, that an assumption of increased property protection since 1998 seems merited. Thus, despite the dated nature of the 1998 data in terms of extent of residential protection, it does provide valuable information regarding the *nature* of protection, once undertaken. The handful of Black Capetonians with some form of residential protection in 1998 relied for the most part on basic strategies such as dogs, window grilles and high fences. Cape coloureds who had protection adopted similar physical strategies, but a minority also used burglar alarms. In contrast, whites with residential protection in 1998 relied heavily on sophisticated alarms, high walls and armed-response private security. The vast majority (80 per cent) of Capetonians with some level of property protection identified it as crucial to alleviating their fear of crime. Although these responses to fear correlate with perceptions of safety noted in the 1998 survey in that those with protection (whites) felt most safe in their residential areas, while those with minimal protection (blacks) felt least safe in their areas, by 2003 the situation had altered. At least at a national level, whites no longer felt safe in their residential areas, even during the daytime, in spite of an increase in excessive fortification. As those with wealth have blockaded themselves in, their fear of the increasingly unknown outside has exploded, leading to further fortification and, hence, deeper fear.

Not content with security-conscious houses, since the early 1990s, wealthy (predominately, but not exclusively, white) South Africans have sought increasingly to avoid crime and mitigate fears by fortifying entire neighbourhoods, closing street access, erecting electrified fences and high walls, as well as employing private security guards and CCTV to patrol and monitor their citadels. This desire for maximum security has led to numerous illegally enclosed neighbourhoods, as local authorities are slow

28. Saff, Grant (2004), "Walls of change: the fortification of post-apartheid South African suburbs", presented at the "South African City" session of the Association of American Geographers annual conference, Philadelphia, 19 March.

29. Indeed, only the province of Gauteng (hosting Johannesburg) has specific legislation regarding enclosures; there is no national policy and at least 500 illegal road closures are believed to exist in Johannesburg alone. See reference 21.

30. For America, see: Blakely, Edward and Mary Gail Snyder (1997), *Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 209 pages. For South Africa, see Karina Landman's numerous publications, in particular: Landman, Karina (2000a), "An overview of enclosed neighbourhoods in South Africa", CSIR, Pretoria; also Landman, Karina (2004), "Who owns the roads? Privatising public space in South African cities through neighbourhood enclosures", presented at the conference on "Privatisation of Urban Space", New Orleans, 26–27 February.

31. Landman, Karina (2000b), "The urban future: enclosed neighbourhoods", paper delivered at a conference on "Urban Futures", Johannesburg, South Africa, 10–14 July.

32. Garland, David (1996), "The limits of the sovereign state", *The British Journal of Criminology* Vol 36, No 4, Autumn, pages 445–471, citation from page 448 quoted in Landman and Schönteich (2002), see reference 21.

to process requests.⁽²⁹⁾ Although enclave supporters claim that gated communities lead to decreased crime and increased community, research in both America and South Africa disputes such suggestions.⁽³⁰⁾ In fact, empirical research indicates that erecting walls and monitoring entrants actually facilitates social exclusion, enhances urban segregation and disrupts urban planning and management (e.g. emergency and municipal service routes). Thus far, Johannesburg has been the prime site of South Africa's residential enclosures, but as crime and fear have risen in Cape Town, South Africa's "murder capital" is embracing a similar fortress fate. Johannesburg's experience thus predicts the future for Cape Town, and as Johannesburg's wealthy areas have become increasingly shaped by "separated and fragmented cells" this has affected not just those living inside, but also those excluded.⁽³¹⁾

V. CONSEQUENCES OF FORTIFICATION

CITIZEN FEAR-MANAGEMENT strategies of erecting walls and enclosing neighbourhoods have had a perverse effect, leaving both public and private spaces devoid of Jacobs' natural surveillance (and thereby less safe), and making use of a perverted form of Newman's "defensible space" to facilitate tribal territorialism that serves to increase fears and deepen segregation.

a. Public order and citizenship

Perceived rises in crime, alongside the perceived inability of the state to protect citizens, has led to the erosion of "...one of the foundational myths of modern societies: namely ... that the sovereign state is capable of providing security, law and order and crime control."⁽³²⁾ Indeed, residential fortressing in South Africa not only operates without consideration for the state, it also rejects implicitly government attempts to diffuse sociospatial tension and facilitate interaction between previously segregated areas. Such government strategies as "activity corridors" (with retail, housing and office space), linking previously segregated areas to facilitate Jacobs-style natural surveillance and establish public spaces that are safe and accessible to all, have been thwarted by private citizens' retreat from public spaces into private enclaves.

More broadly, the consequence of replacing public space with private space, and transforming public space in order to discourage "deviants" (e.g. through the use of gates, electronic surveillance) is, paradoxically, a decline in public order. Because instigators of preventative spatial re-ordering (for instance, private citizens) have no responsibility for "outside" (i.e. public order), the consequence is a spiral of ever-increasing segregation and unsafe public space for all. Ironically, strategies to increase safety (by privatizing space) actually increase the dangerousness of remaining public space by abandoning it to those excluded from the privatized world. These strategies invoke limited profit-driven understandings of public safety, failing (or refusing) to recognize the fine line between safety and exclusion, and legitimizing the latter supposedly in the name of the former.

This retreat from public space promotes inequality and separation, which are irreconcilable with the democratic values of universality and equality, crucial to post-apartheid South Africa. Segregation ensures that

public space is unsafe for everyone, rendering usage a conditional right. In South Africa, restricted access to public space could be interpreted as preventing a citizen's right to "freedom of movement" as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.⁽³³⁾ In Brazil, Caldeira notes that fortressing has rejected the rights of those perceived as a threat, thus undermining democracy.⁽³⁴⁾ Democracy requires the acceptance that different social groups deserve equal rights, whereas segregation encourages the polarization of social groups in distinct universes.

b. Increased fear and segregation

Fortified enclaves spatially segregate social difference by physical separation (walls, gates), symbolic exclusion (perceptions of undesirables), private security (armed guards, electronic surveillance), inward-facing self-containment and (artificial) social homogeneity.

Such bounded spaces are promoted by fear-of-crime rhetoric and "not in my back yard" ("NIMBY") exclusionist and escapist mentalities. Their proponents promote enclaves as being necessary in providing protection from the external city, and as crucial for fostering community in the midst of urban anomie. Indeed, Charles Jencks views enclaves as an inevitable and realistic solution to Los Angeles' ethnic heterogeneity, explaining that they limit cross-cultural contact and thus prevent conflict.⁽³⁵⁾ However, walls cannot create "community", and Jencks' implicit endorsement of racist avoidance ignores the inequality of segregation, while his belief that separation eliminates conflict is not empirically proven. Defensible housing and planning of this variety can actually increase crime and conflict by deepening sociospatial isolation, fear and inequality. In his dramatic comparison of modern Los Angeles to Ridley Scott's "blade runner" urban future, Mike Davis describes Los Angeles as a "fortress city" in which segregation and fear have facilitated contained and warring spaces and a kind of class war.⁽³⁶⁾ Jacobs and Newman are similarly negative, believing that enclaves encourage a territorial "gang way of looking at life" (i.e. territorial tribalism), bringing the "end of civilization"⁽³⁷⁾ and "total lockup".⁽³⁸⁾

Although South Africa is still relatively new to the "gated community" scene, experience elsewhere reinforces such pessimism. For example, in North America and Brazil, "walls and gates" have reinforced a vicious circle of poverty and exclusion by concentrating the poorest social groups in spaces with minimal economic and political leverage. In South Africa, the pervasive and resilient nature of apartheid's physical and symbolic sociospatial exclusion indicates a strong potential for emulating these experiences. Furthermore, enclaves do not just respond to difference and fear, but actually deepen segregation and reinforce fear by excluding difference and limiting social mixing, thus increasing paranoia and mistrust between groups.

c. Is fortification only about fear of crime?

Although fear of crime is the common justification for urban forms of a segregating nature, such as gated communities, this often disguises underlying motives. Gold and Revill define this as "fear of crime plus"⁽³⁹⁾ and, although Judd suggests that fear of crime is code for fear of race,⁽⁴⁰⁾ the wider reality is fear of difference.

Indeed, fear in South Africa is not solely linked to crime but masks fear

33. Section 21(1), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), quoted in Landman and Schönteich (2002), see reference 21.

34. Caldeira, Teresa (1996b), "Crime and individual rights: re-framing the question of violence in Latin America" in Jelin, Elizabeth and Eric Hershberg (editors), *Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pages 197–211.

35. Jencks, Charles (1993), *Heteropolis: Los Angeles, the Riots and the Strange Beauty of Hetero-Architecture*, Academic Editions, London, 144 pages.

36. Davis, Mike (1990), *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*, Verso, London, 462 pages, citations from pages 224 and 288.

37. Jane Jacobs quoted on page 11 of Dillon (1994), see reference 2.

38. See reference 6.

39. Gold, John and George Revill (2001), "Exploring landscapes of fear: marginality, spectacle and surveillance", presented at a one-day workshop on "The Geography and Politics of Fear", University of London, 3 July.

40. Judd, Dennis (1994), "Urban violence and enclave politics: crime as text, race as subtext" in Dunn, Seamus (editor), *Managing Divided Cities*, Ryburn Publishing, Keele, pages 160–175.

41. According to a 1996 survey conducted by the Institute of Security Studies. See Shaw, Mark (1998), "South Africa: crime and policing in post-apartheid South Africa" in Rotberg, Robert and Greg Mills (editors), *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pages 24–44, survey results on page 43.

42. These discourses are analyzed in depth in various publications by Saff. See, in particular, Saff, Grant (2001), "Exclusionary discourse towards squatters in suburban Cape Town", *Ecumene* Vol 8, No 1, pages 87–107; also Saff, Grant (1998), *Changing Cape Town: Urban Dynamics, Policy and Planning during the Political Transition in South Africa*, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 258 pages. The quote is cited on page 107 and is from *The Argus* newspaper (10 November 1990).

43. See reference 42, Saff (2001), page 102.

of "other". This can be seen in perceptions of the causes of crime; while whites see rising crime as representing the new (black) government's inability to rule (i.e. protect citizens), blacks attribute increased crime to unfinished democracy and African immigrants.⁽⁴¹⁾ Whites have long used fear of crime as a euphemism for fear of blacks; apartheid's *swart gevaar* and *skollie menace* justified segregation, and post-apartheid uncertainty extends this to fear of "their" rule. For blacks, crime is not new, but upsurges are linked to the influx of Black African foreigners, colloquially known as *Ma-kwere-kwere* (this title refers to the unintelligible sound of Black African foreigners' languages such as French and Portuguese), following the 1990 border openings. Thus fear is linked to ignorance.

However, this fear of difference is not brazenly displayed, but hidden under more "acceptable" discourses. For example, in the early 1990s, several informal settlements emerged on land adjacent to affluent white areas in Cape Town and, although the predominately white property owners in neighbouring suburbs were adamant that race was not the issue, they protested for "their" removal from "our" land. Justifications such as fear of crime, decreasing property values, ecological/environmental degradation and increased taxes were emphasized, along with socioeconomic arguments that "...putting two value systems next to each other can [not] work."⁽⁴²⁾ All these various arguments essentially concealed a predominantly racist fear of "other".

Linking the fear of crime to certain social groups and places directs fear away from the crime and towards the unknown other. Indeed, crimes with easily identifiable offenders rarely affect the fear of crime; whereas a sense that an unknown other is responsible renders problems uncontrollable and increases fears. The image of this other is fuelled by everyday "talk of crime", in which incidents are magnified and the criminal is constructed as a member of the collective other (usually poor and black), seeking to penetrate "our" sociospatial purity. This encourages a "them and us" mentality, giving rise to exclusionary mechanisms legitimized as reactions to fear of crime, but actually a consequence of prejudiced fear. Fear of crime is thus an expression of powerlessness due to loss of control over territory and urban order.

Excluding other social groups spatially reinforces the social construct of "other" as dangerous, providing further exclusionary justification as well as further fear. This competition for space polarizes insiders ("with access to desirable space") and outsiders ("on the margins, looking in").⁽⁴³⁾ When a simplistic white-black lens is replaced by this insider-outsider perspective, it helps to explain why township blacks oppose black squatters and immigrants, in the same way that whites oppose black squatters but accept affluent blacks. Apartheid used this individual "right" to space as justification for white supremacy, while the post-apartheid context is developing a virtually identical included/excluded sociospatial system.

VI. CONCLUSION

ALTHOUGH CAPE TOWN manifests diverse fear-management strategies, the universal consequence is increasing fear amidst a reinforcement of apartheid-style sociospatial divisions. For while the rich barricade themselves behind electrified fences, the poor devise their own strategies, and fear is equally prevalent across all socioeconomic and race groups. High walls, dogs, armed guards and enclosed neighbourhoods have not

brought peace of mind but have reproduced fears (via “talk of crime”), as homogenous groups are sociospatially distanced from their “other”. This sociospatial segregation and unequal ability to protect appears remarkably similar to urban apartheid.

a. Comparison to the apartheid city

It was predictable that apartheid’s sociospatial entrenchment would constrain post-apartheid urban development, but inherited obstacles have been magnified by post-apartheid responses to fear. Three key similarities between the apartheid and post-apartheid city are identified: first, the use of fear to justify exclusion; second, the use of spatial mechanisms to displace social problems; and third, the dominance of social and symbolic exclusionism.

As identified above, the concept of fear was a key foundation of apartheid, with the government using *swart gevaar* (Black danger) fear to exclude blacks. Indeed, in promoting the Groups Areas Act (1950), the Minister of the Interior remarked: “...as soon as there is a group area then all your *uncertainties* are removed.”⁽⁴⁴⁾ In the post-apartheid era it is now citizens rather than the government who are using fear to justify sociospatial exclusion. Although fear of crime is the accepted mantra, it clearly masks fear of difference.

Second, apartheid and pre-apartheid strategies of removing urban blacks to peripheral settlements in order to displace problems (Swanson’s “sanitation syndrome”), based on the premise that removing problems from visibility effectively removes the problem, is evident in post-apartheid “NIMBYist” attitudes. This is further strengthened by citizens’ residential responses, through which poor blacks are prevented from travelling in wealthy areas by privately controlled access points in a manner worryingly similar to apartheid’s “passes” for urban blacks.

Third, apartheid’s reliance on social exclusion strategies ensured minimal mixing and maximum ignorance. Apartheid encouraged all races to consider themselves separate nations, with distinct physical boundaries and symbolic identities. Such social and symbolic exclusions remain strong, with Cape Town reported as a “city of exclusions, not inclusions”, more polarized and segregated today than in the 1980s.⁽⁴⁵⁾ With the sudden proximity of difference, citizens have emulated the fear-management strategy they previously witnessed the state operating, that of sociospatial exclusion and segregation. The dominance of symbolic exclusionary mentalities threatens to undermine South Africa’s future. Apartheid’s strongest legacy is thus not physical structure but symbolic exclusionism.

b. Alternative solutions?

While modernist planning sought to “manage” fear by purifying public space, post-apartheid planning needs to encourage citizens to overcome and face fears in order to embrace diversity and combat symbolic exclusionism. Given the negative public consequences of unchecked citizen initiative, a primary objective of any strategy must be the reconciliation of urban planning and citizen needs.

For example, government approaches fail to address directly the fear which dominates citizens’ lives. Given the temporal and sociospatial nature of this fear, those designing strategies would do well to consider

44. Massey, Douglas and Nancy Denton (1993), *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*, Harvard University Press, London, 292 pages, citation from page 1 – author’s bold.

45. Rostron, Bryan (2001), “The last outpost”, *Mail & Guardian Newspaper*, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 July.

where people feel least safe and what causes these feelings (not necessarily risk of victimization). It would seem likely that the media and everyday "talk of crime" are as powerful in perpetuating fear of crime as crime itself.

c. The future?

Landman projects current urban trends into the future, depicting a 2020 Johannesburg city of "urban forts". Her description parallels Davis's Los Angeles predictions, with wealthy citizens confined to protected enclaves, only exiting safety zones within protected cars for brief exposures to "war zone" public space.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Although seemingly melodramatic, the consequences of abandoning public space are already evident in South Africa's city centres, where residential and business flight to the suburbs has resulted in slum-like inner-cities and racial turnover from white to black.

This article has revealed the impact of fear of crime on citizen residential strategies, and their ultimate consequences for increased sociospatial segregation. This "new apartheid" is not driven solely by fear of crime, but also by fear of, and prejudice against, other social groups, encouraged by South Africa's exclusionary history. Redressing this urban sociospatial inequality requires that exclusionary mindsets be challenged. Whether the *physical* urban future will mean military public space, fortified citadels or integrated neighbourhoods remains to be seen. But in the absence of strategies to overcome *symbolic* exclusionism, the latter seems increasingly unlikely.

46. See reference 31.

