Urban violence and insecurity: an introductory roadmap

CAROLINE O N MOSER

SUMMARY: Violence in cities has reached record levels in many nations, and is having a devastating impact on people’s health and livelihoods and on the economic prospects of many cities. Fear of violence isolates the poor in their homes and the rich in their segregated spaces. Violence, the use of physical force which causes hurt to others, can also be defined to include psychological hurt and material deprivation. Different categories of violence can be identified (although they frequently overlap): political violence (driven by the will to hold or retain political power); economic violence (motivated by material gain); social violence (much of it gender-based) and institutional violence (including community vigilantism). It is important to distinguish between structural causes of violence (generally related to unequal power relations) and trigger risk factors (circumstances that exacerbate the likelihood of violence occurring). The extent to which it is poverty or inequality that contributes to crime and violence is debated although, in reality, they frequently overlap. In other contexts, the “politicization of crime” is the predominant cause, with the “urbanization of warfare” a particular concern in regional conflict zones. The spatial causes of violence are particularly important in cities and their peripheries, which often contain unsafe spaces where rape, robbery and violent crime are more likely to occur. Urban space is increasingly being reorganized in response to crime and violence and to the lack of confidence in the state’s provision of security. The rich retreat to “fortified enclaves”, or use sophisticated transport networks and privatized security systems to isolate themselves from the poor, who are seen as the perpetrators of violence.

Approaches to violence prevention include such sector-specific approaches as criminal justice to control and treat violence, and the public health model, which aims at prevention. Newer approaches include conflict transformation (reflecting increasing concern with political and institutional violence), crime prevention through environmental design, and community-based approaches to rebuilding trust and social capital. More effective violence prevention has to reverse the almost universal distrust in the state’s capacity to control or prevent crime and violence.

I. INTRODUCTION

VIOLENCE HAS REACHED record levels in many cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and has become a critical threat to the security of urban dwellers and to productivity and development. But as we try to comprehend the complex, multi-layered nature of urban violence, the phenomenon itself is not static. Along with newer preoccupations such as globalization, post-9/11 fears and insecurities, international migration and “failing” states, not to mention long-term difficulties of exclusion, poverty and inequality, the face of urban violence itself is also rapidly changing.

II. DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES

VIOLENCE IS USUALLY defined as the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others. Broader definitions include psychological hurt and material deprivation. Most definitions recognize that violence involves the exercise of power to legitimize the use of force for specific gains. Definitions of violence often overlap with those of conflict and crime, although there are important distinctions. Conflict-based power struggles do not necessarily inflict physical or mental harm on others, while violence by its very nature does. Crime, similarly, does not have to entail violence.

The insecurity generated by violence is expressed in fear, which has been defined as “the institutional, cultural and psychological repercussion of violence”, and identified as an outcome of destabilization, exclusion and uncertainty. Although perceptions of insecurity cannot be reflected in statistical evidence, they fundamentally affect well-being. The ability of the poor to access resources for survival (“livelihood security”) is closely linked to violence, relating not only to the spatial, economic and social constraints imposed by endemic violence but also to the failure of the state to provide protection. Although there are no hard boundaries between different types of urban violence, policy makers...
a person; an instance of this or the distress resulting from this."


11. See the paper by Dennis Rodgers listed on the back page.

12. See the paper by Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Ana María Jaramillo listed on the back page.


Table 1: Categories, types and manifestations of violence in urban areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of violence</th>
<th>Types of violence by perpetrators and/or victims</th>
<th>Manifestations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>• State and non-state violence</td>
<td>• Guerrilla conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Paramilitary conflict</td>
<td>• Paramilitary conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political assassinations</td>
<td>• Political assassinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Armed conflict between political parties</td>
<td>• Armed conflict between political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td>• Violence of state and other “informal”</td>
<td>• Extra-judicial killings by police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“informal” institutions</td>
<td>• Physical or psychological abuse by health and education workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• State or community vigilante-directed social cleansing of gangs and street children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Lynching of suspected criminals by community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>• Organized crime</td>
<td>• Intimidation and violence as means of resolving economic disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Business interests</td>
<td>• Street theft, robbery and crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Delinquents</td>
<td>• Kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Robbers</td>
<td>• Armed robbery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Drug-trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Car theft and other contraband activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Small-arms dealing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Assaults including killing and rape in the course of economic crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Trafficking in prostitutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Conflict over scarce resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic/social</strong></td>
<td>• Gangs</td>
<td>• Territorial or identity-based “turf” violence; robbery, theft</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Street children (boys and girls)</td>
<td>• Petty theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethnic violence</td>
<td>• Communal riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>• Intimate partner violence inside the home</td>
<td>• Physical or psychological male–female abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sexual violence (including rape)</td>
<td>• Physical and sexual abuse, particularly prevalent in the case of stepfathers but also uncles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• in the public arena</td>
<td>• Physical and psychological abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Child abuse: boys and girls</td>
<td>• Incivility in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intergenerational conflict between parents and</td>
<td>• Arguments that get out of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>children</td>
<td>• Guerilla conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gratuitous/routine daily violence</td>
<td>• Paramilitary conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Including the private sector</td>
<td>• Political assassinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Doing business</td>
<td>• Armed conflict between political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Celebrating</td>
<td>• Lynching of suspected criminals by community members</td>
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and practitioners need to categorize the phenomenon in order to design interventions to prevent or reduce it. Table 1 provides examples within four categories – political, institutional, economic and social violence – pointing to some of the more common perpetrators and manifestations of each category. Much social violence is gender-based, linked to gendered power relations and constructions of masculinities, and includes intimate-partner violence and child abuse inside the home as well as sexual abuse in the public arena. Social violence also includes ethnic violence, territorial or identity-based violence linked to gangs. Economic violence, motivated by material gain, is associated with street crime, including mugging, robbery and violence linked to drugs and kidnapping. Closely related is institutional violence, perpetrated by state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, but also by officials in sector ministries such as health and education, as well as groups operating outside the state, such as social cleansing vigilante groups. Political violence, driven by the will to win or hold political power, includes guerilla or paramilitary conflict or political assassination. Although closely linked to conflict and war, political violence is also committed during peacetime. Since any categorization is, by definition, too static to represent a dynamic and holistic phenomenon, the four-fold typology is conceived as an interrelated continuum with close linkages between different types of violence.
Violence may not always be just a physical act but also "structural", as explained by Galtung, who extended the notion of violence beyond overt brutality to include the exploitation, exclusion, inequality and injustice implicit in social structures.  

III. THE TRENDS AND MEASUREMENT OF URBAN VIOLENCE

ALTHOUGH ACCELERATING RATES of violence and crime are not only urban problems, they are particularly problematic in many urban areas. The sheer scale of violence in many poor areas or slums means that it has become “routinized” or “normalized” into daily life, provoking references to “failed cities” and “cities of chaos”. Fear and insecurity pervade people’s lives, with serious implications for trust and well-being among communities and individuals. What Taussig calls “terror as usual” can exhibit itself through street crime, a growing gang culture and high levels of violence in the private realm. The range of types of urban violence and crime is both complex and context-specific. In an urban Jamaican community, for instance, local residents listed 19 types of violence; the average number identified in nine Guatemalan poor urban communities was 41, while in Colombia the comparable average was 25.

Despite the high prevalence of rural violence in the past, violence is commonly most severe in large urban areas. City-level differences in homicide levels can be striking. In Latin America in 2000, rates ranged from 6.4 per 100,000 per year in Buenos Aires to 248 per 100,000 in Medellín. Violence is not manifested in the same way in different cities, even within the same nation. For example, in Brazil, between 1979 and 1998, the homicide rate in Metropolitan Rio de Janeiro rose by 35 per cent, but in Metropolitan São Paulo it increased by 103 per cent. Differences in rural–urban violence levels are less marked in post-conflict countries, where rural violence is often still more extreme than in urban areas. In El Salvador, 76 per cent of homicides occur in rural areas, as against only 24 per cent in urban areas.

Within cities, variations in violence levels are related to neighbourhood income levels, gender and age. More prosperous areas suffer from violent crime, usually property-related, but severe violence is generally concentrated in lower-income areas, particularly in the marginal periphery. However, increases in vehicle robbery – with the growing risk of being killed in the process – have heightened insecurity among the wealthier population. Young men are more likely to be both the victims and the perpetrators of violence. Even in countries with relatively low levels of violence, not only is male juvenile violence rising, but its intensity is increasing.

The measurement of violence is limited by a number of constraints. Mortality statistics, often used as proxies for violence, are notoriously unreliable. The most commonly used indicator of violent crime, the homicide rate, disregards non-fatal violence, and generally includes both intentional and unintentional violence (such as car accidents). National and regional differences in data collection methods, recall periods and cultural definitions of crime and violence also limit the validity of cross-country comparisons. The measurement of such intangible but significant factors as fear is also problematic. A useful contribution to measurement is the incorporation of questions on violence into broader household surveys – a low-cost way to procure data that is probably more accurate than police statistics. Growing recognition that quantitative methodologies fail to capture people’s daily experience has resulted in increased use of complementary qualitative sociological and anthropological methodologies, including the use of solicited personal diaries. Other participatory appraisal techniques have also proved invaluable in giving voice to people’s perceptions of violence.

IV. CAUSES, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE

IT IS IMPORTANT to distinguish between structural causes of violence (generally related to unequal power relations) and trigger risk factors (situational circumstances that can exacerbate the likelihood of violence occurring). Trigger risk factors for gender-based violence, for instance, frequently include drug and alcohol use. Understanding structural factors requires a holistic approach, one of the best-known of which is the “ecological model”, which maps the way in which factors at different levels (individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural) combine to contribute to violence. Another holistic framework locates the situation-specific nature of people’s experience of violence within a broader structural context, identifying underlying factors in terms of structure, identity and agency. Since issues of power and powerlessness are fundamental to understanding violence, this allows for the analysis of the wider political and socioeconomic power structure within which individual realities are manifest, and recognizes that experiences of violence depend on such elements as gender, age, ethnicity and race. Finally, identity is closely related to “human agency”, or the recognition that individuals are social actors who face alternative ways of formulating their objectives, however restricted their resources. Socially constructed levels of tolerance to violence can vary considerably, and are
vital to any policy to reduce violence. For instance, the social acceptance of domestic violence and of substance abuse within communities can not only contribute to violence but also stand in the way of effective prevention.\(^{280}\)

In urban contexts, a particularly important debate concerns the extent to which crime and violence are causally rooted in poverty or inequality. Poverty has long been considered the predominant determinant of violence, but more recently this relationship has been challenged as too simplistic. Interpretations based on statistical modelling have demonstrated that inequality is more influential than poverty, with income inequalities being generally more marked in urban than rural areas.\(^{290}\) Some analysts argue that increased levels of violence are also closely tied to processes of globalization and structural adjustment as well as political democratization. At the same time, the daily living conditions of the urban poor heighten the potential for conflict, crime or violence.\(^{290}\)

The new theme of the “politicization of crime” is a growing concern in contexts where state institutions are challenged or superseded by non-state forms of social governance. The “urbanization of warfare” is becoming a common phenomenon in regional conflict zones or in those that have recently emerged from war. The changing nature of warfare also benefits those most involved in organized crime – with “open-war economies” serving to integrate the urban with global criminal economies.\(^{290}\)

The spatial causes of violence are particularly important in cities and their peripheries, which often contain unsafe spaces (dark lanes, isolated bus stops, public latrines) where rape, robbery and violent crime take place.\(^{292}\) Urban space is increasingly being reorganized in response to high levels of crime and to the lack of confidence in the state’s capacity to provide effective security. The rich retreat to “fortified enclaves”, or make use of sophisticated transport networks and privatized security systems that effectively isolate them from the poor, who are seen as the perpetrators of violence.\(^{293}\)

Closely related to the causal factors underlying violence are the costs and consequences of violent action. Most relevant research is based on the categorization of direct and indirect costs.\(^{294}\) Probably the greatest advances have been made with measurements of direct economic costs, such as the associated losses due to deaths and disabilities, and “transferrals” resulting from property crimes, calculated as percentages of GNP or GDP. Such measurements are useful for understanding the impact of crime on both individuals and society, and for allowing for a comparison with the costs of other social ills, with important policy implications in terms of cost-benefit assessments. However, constraints include, in many contexts, lack of access to information on violence-related expenditure assessments of the police, the judiciary, the penal system and even the armed forces. At the same time, many components of indirect costs, both for individuals and society as a whole, are intangible, and no reliable quantitative data exist.

From the extensive “livelihood” debate, a consensus has emerged with regard to the identification of five types of capital assets: physical, financial, human, social and natural;\(^{295}\) the multiple outcomes of violence can also be analyzed in terms of their direct and indirect effects on each of these. Violence erodes financial capital through its drain on criminal justice services and the health care system, decreased investment and institutional costs. Human capital costs (reductions in life expectancy, victims’ reduced educational opportunities and productivity in the workplace) also have financial implications. The consequences for social capital include insecurity, fear and a deteriorating quality of life, with ramifications in terms of trust and restrictions on community life.\(^{296}\)

V. VIOLENCE REDUCTION INTERVENTIONS THAT FOCUS ON THE URBAN POOR

URBAN CRIME AND violence prevention and reduction is now a growth industry. Table 2 identifies some policy approaches and their associated urban-focused interventions. These include such sector-specific approaches as criminal justice to control and treat economic violence, and the public health (epidemiological) approach aimed at prevention. Newer approaches such as conflict transformation and human rights reflect increasing concern with political and institutional violence. Recent recognition of the importance of more integrated, holistic approaches has encouraged cross-sectoral approaches such as citizen security, CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design) and urban renewal. Still in the process of development are local-level community-based approaches to rebuild trust and social capital.

Such policies are essentially ideal types. In reality, policy makers have shifted towards more integrated approaches that acknowledge not only the multiple forms of violence but also the identity and agency of different social actors. To date, there has been little rigorous evaluation of violence-reduction interventions; this leads to an expectation that a diversity of interventions will together achieve the desired result. It is widely recognized that there are no magic bullets or one-off solutions to violence reduction. Some approaches work better than others and are more appropriate in some settings than in others. There are some common themes, however:
38. See the papers by Mo Hume and by Cathy McIlwaine and Caroline O N Moser listed on the back page.

39. A recent global study showed income inequality to be an important determinant of national homicide rates, after controlling for the distribution of education, poverty, ethnic and economic polarization, security services and social capital. In turn, the effects of income inequality on criminal activities depend on socioeconomic status, with the poor being more responsive than the rich. See reference 27, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998), page 8.

40. Vanderschueren, F (1996), “From violence to justice and security in cities”, Environment and Urbanization Vol 8, No 1, April, pages 93–112; also the paper by Zeina Halabi listed on the back page.

41. See the paper by Daniel Esser listed on the back page.


43. See the papers by Charlotte Lemanski and by Dennis Rodgers listed on the back page.


47. See reference 17, Moser and McIlwaine (2004); also the papers

Table 2: Policy approaches to violence and associated urban-focused interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy approach</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Types of violence</th>
<th>Innovative urban-focused interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Criminal justice | Violence deterrence and control through higher arrest, conviction rates and more severe punishment | • Crime  
• Robbery  
• Corruption | Judicial reform |
| Public health | Violence prevention through the reduction of individual risk factors | • Youth violence | Youth policies/social protection  
Education reform  
Entrepreneurship |
| Conflict transformation/human rights | Non-violent resolution of conflict through negotiation and legal enforcement of human rights by states and other social actors | • Political violence  
• Institutional violence  
• HR abuses  
• Arbitrary detention | Traditional systems of justice  
Government human rights advocates or ombudsman  
Civil society advocacy NGOs |
| CPTED/urban renewal | Reduction in violence opportunities through focusing on the settings of crime rather than on the perpetrators | • Economic violence  
• Social violence | Municipal-level programmes |
| Citizen/public/community security | Set of cross-sector measures to prevent or reduce violence | • Economic violence  
• Social violence | National-level programmes  
Municipal-level programmes |
| Social capital | “Rebuilding” social capital, trust and cohesion in informal and formal social institutions | • Youth gangs/maras  
• Domestic/family violence | Community-based solutions  
Crisis services for victims  
Ongoing support and prevention  
Communication campaigns  
School programmes  
Programmes for perpetrators |


- The almost universal distrust and lack of confidence in the state’s capacity to control or prevent crime and violence, and the associated structural problems within existing police and judiciary systems.
- The rapid expansion of non-state forms of social governance (closely associated with the lack of confidence in the state). This can support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, but it can also generate perverse rather than productive forms of social capital, such as revenge violence, vigilante crime and other extra-judicial forms of justice.\(^\text{47}\)
The privatization of security, with state authorities either contracting or condoning private security firms to conduct public policing – solutions that focus more on the rich than on the poor. There is growing consensus about the importance of consulting local communities in designing appropriate solutions, whether in drawing on young people’s perceptions about solutions for gang violence, facilitating face-to-face communication with excluded communities, or promoting, in a range of ways, productive partnerships between the police and local communities.

Finally, there is the issue of fear. In cities across the world, relentless “routinized” daily violence dominates the lives of local populations. Fear of such violence isolates the poor in their homes and the rich in their segregated spaces. This isolation, in turn, perpetuates a fear of the “other” and contributes to the social, economic and political fragmentation of cities. To date, few violence-related strategies have confronted or addressed the issue of fear or its associated relationship to power and powerlessness. Ultimately, this may provide a critically important mechanism for redressing the impact of violence on the daily lives of the poor and excluded in cities throughout the world.

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