Africa’s new cities: The contested future of urbanisation

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Abstract
New private property investments in Africa’s cities are on the rise, and they often take the form of entirely new cities built up from scratch as comprehensively planned self-contained enclaves. As these new city-making trajectories are expanding and empirical research is emerging, there is a need to provide more conceptual clarity. We systematically examine the diversity of new cities in Africa; elicit their financial trajectories; and set an agenda for critically examining their actual and expected implications, by learning transnational lessons from debates on gated communities, peri-urban land governance and displacement, and older waves of new city building. Although most new cities are private-led projects, they are inserted into diverse and dynamic political economies with states ranging from developmentalist to neoliberal to absent. The consumptive and supply-driven character of many projects so far (resembling gated communities for middle and higher classes), their insertion into ‘rurban’ spaces with complex land governance arrangements, and their tendency to implement post-democratic private-sector-driven governance will make them at best unsuitable for solving Africa’s urban problems, and at worst they will increase expulsions and enclosures of the poor, public funding injustice and socio-spatial segregation and fragmentation.

Keywords
Africa, land, new cities, satellite cities, urban restructuring

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The future of the world’s urbanisation will be in Africa: the continent’s urban population will almost triple in the coming 35 years, with more than 1.3 billion Africans living in cities by 2050 (21% of the world’s urban population) (UN DESA, 2014). This implies a steep increase in demand for urban housing, infrastructure and services, on top of existing backlogs. Governments in many African countries have so far been unable to structurally address the aforementioned matters, and have therefore shifted from a providing to an enabling approach, with the state encouraging private-sector investments in urban housing, infrastructure and services.

New private investments in housing and urban development are increasingly reaching Africa: foreign and domestic companies are investing in African urban property (Bhan, 2014; De Boeck, 2014; Grant, 2015; Murray, 2015a, 2015b; Watson, 2013). Current African property investment often takes a particular form, inspired by Asian and Middle Eastern examples: entirely new cities are built up from scratch as comprehensively planned self-contained enclaves in the outskirts of existing cities. In other cases, city centres are ‘upgraded’ and converted into entirely new cities.

While private-sector property investment and ‘new cities’ are presented as a rational response to projections of high urban population growth and unsustainable patterns of urbanisation, clearly the pressing housing needs of Africa’s urban poor are in no way met by these projects: almost all these investments seem directed at the ‘rapidly growing’ middle and high classes of Africa’s cities (Grant, 2015; Hattingh et al., 2012; KPMG, 2012), including foreign expat populations.

New city constructions across Africa are promoted by real estate investors as eco, smart and satellite cities, and as large-scale gated enclaves of a mixed residential–commercial land use (combined with technology hubs or Special Economic Zones). These spectacular iconic cities are meant as showcases in the global economy or ‘world class cities’ (Roy and Ong, 2011).

The recent appearance of a variety of master-planned city plans in Africa has attracted attention in the academic literature. However, as these new city-making trajectories are expanding and worldwide empirical research is emerging, there is a need to provide more conceptual clarity on the phenomenon, and to explore the boundaries of it. In this article, based on a review of academic and professional literature, as well as internet sources, we draw a typology and conceptualisation of ‘new city’ making in Africa. We systematically examine the forms and diversity of new cities in Africa; elicit their financial trajectories; and set an agenda for critically examining the actual and expected mechanisms of (1) in/exclusion, displacement and land governance, (2) socio-spatial segregation and (3) political-democratic urban fragmentation and justice.

Whereas Africa is central in our analysis, we do maintain a transnational outlook. Hence we aim to engage in transnational learning on the main critical issues regarding new cities, without falling into the trap of generalisation (Sheppard et al., 2015). We follow the postcolonial theorists’ plea for theorising from the South (Bunnell et al., 2012; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson and Roy, 2016) and engage with a global range of literature and experiences (Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin American) in
order to articulate a view of the urban that does not take Euro-American urbanisation as the point of reference.

**Neoliberal urban restructuring and new cities**

In response to dramatic urban growth scenarios and global financial and economic transformation, current urban investment and restructuring in the Global South often takes a particularly neoliberal form: as Sheppard et al. (2015) state, an urban revolution from above is taking place, entailing the worldwide implementation of mainstream neoliberal urban growth strategies. In tandem with the increased independence and competitive character of cities and urban regions, there is a perceived need for establishing ‘world class cities’ (Roy and Ong, 2011) which cater for ‘world class’ enterprises, high quality services and financial sectors, elite and expat residents, and tourists. Post-crisis global financial capital has been shifting and looking for new spatial fixes, e.g. in African urban development (Sheppard et al., 2015; Watson, 2013). Beyond finance, cities are influenced by the rapid mobilities of powerful urban models, ideas, and policies on a global scale (Bunnell, 2015); such urban inter-referencing does not only take place in traditional North–South ways, but increasing attention is paid to South–South connections too (Bunnell et al., 2012).

This article is concerned with a particular urban form that is often assumed to emanate from such neoliberal urban strategies and inter-referencing: the new city. These can take the form of entirely new cities built up from scratch as comprehensively planned self-contained enclaves in the outskirts of existing cities. In other cases, city centres are ‘upgraded’ and converted into entirely new cities, for example in Kigali, Kinshasa and Addis Ababa. They are often iconic, themed cities, spectacular showcases in the global economy. ‘High-modernist’ (Scott, 1998) master-planned city building, after having been out of fashion for many decades, is making a return in the urban planning practices of Asia, the Middle East and most recently Africa. However, the post-colonial utopian ideas of social justice have made way for a more elitist and privatised type of new city.

Academics have criticised the increasing number of new master-planned city designs in Africa (Cain, 2014; Cirolia, 2014; Croese 2012; De Boeck, 2011, 2014; Grant, 2015; Moser, 2015; Watson, 2013). For example, Watson (2013) frames such African ‘urban fantasies’ as a form of speculative urbanism (see Goldman, 2011). Reflecting strong paradigms of modernisation and utopias of ‘slum-free’ well-managed urban environments (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015), sometimes combined with discourses of ecological modernisation (eco-cities; see Caprotti et al., 2015) and technological fixes (smart cities), such master-planned cities appear highly attractive to investors and local elites alike.

Research on new cities so far indicates a clear mismatch between their promise to solve the pressing issues of sustainable urbanisation and population growth on the one hand, and their reality as higher class consumption enclaves on the other. The framing of these self-contained urban projects as ‘urgent’ and ‘inevitable’ in the context of Africa’s rapid urban population growth also means that displacement of poor city dwellers is regarded as a necessary evil. Indeed, land speculation, exclusion and displacement appear as key problems; and other criticism has focused on the privatisation of governance in new cities and on the outdated, unrealistic and unfair character of tabula rasa urbanism (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015; Moser et al., 2015; Murray, 2015a; Watson, 2013).
Given the novelty of new city making in Africa, empirical research on its implications is inevitably largely lacking. However, much can be learnt from existing new cities and related phenomena and debates worldwide. Drawing ideas from comparisons with Latin American neoliberal urbanism and Asian speculative urbanism (Goldman, 2011; Lin and Yi, 2011), as well as earlier examples of new city making and related phenomena such as gated communities, will allow for new directions to be set out. It would be mistaken to try to discern any inevitable paths (Sheppard et al., 2015), but we can observe the intersections between global urban trends and trajectories and local conjunctures. This also means that we should be more precise on the character of new cities and the diverse socioeconomic and political trajectories that have led to their conception. Even though we argue that many of today’s new cities emerge from a neoliberal drive to ‘create the next world city’ in order to be competitive and attract investment, we acknowledge that goals may diverge. Beyond acknowledging that hybrid forms and varieties of neoliberalism exist (Peck et al., 2013), we argue that new city models across Africa and the governance contexts that gave rise to them can vary from clearly neoliberal, more-than-neoliberal, to not necessarily neoliberal at all (Bunnell, 2015: 1992; see also Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Hence we pay attention to how new cities are financed and how they relate to diverging types of governance. In addition we engage with a relational view of the urban which does not take ‘global forces’ as a starting point, but sheds light on the diversity of connections between Africa’s new cities on the one hand and investors and ideas from different parts of the world, including parts of Asia and the Middle East, on the other.

The complex landscape of new cities: Drawing a typology

New cities and new city plans across Africa differ in their spatial forms, locations, purposes/aims, marketing terms and relation to existing cities; and these are connected to their local and national context which vary greatly across the continent. We thus need to emphasise and make sense of their diversity and locate new cities in the intersections of various interlinked global urban developments.

In order to elicit these complexities, we propose a typology as presented in Table 1. We have identified a variety of more than 70 existing and planned African new cities in this typology, in order to show their prevalence and diversity. Figure 1 visualises the geographical distribution of new cities and plans across the continent.

In Table 1 we aim to show how the new cities phenomenon entails a variety of urban forms, and interrelates with various other (often longer-standing) urban forms such as gated communities, Special Economic Zones, and so on. There is much to be learnt from these related forms and phenomena, which often have longer histories. On a continual horizontal axis cities are placed by their purpose; ranging from political/administrative (capital city) to residential/commercial (housing for different social groups, often connected to commercial development) to productive (technology, innovation, industry). The boundaries between the categories are often not exact and can change over time; thus we propose this as a continuum rather than a strict typology.

On the vertical axis, cities are classified according to their spatial character and relationship with existing cities; from totally independent cities to inner city restructurings; with satellite cities and suburbs
(including cities within cities) in between. Here again, we propose a continuum: it is often difficult to determine where the existing city ends and a satellite city begins.

In terms of purpose, a clear and traditional example is the new capital city, built for political, administrative and bureaucratic purposes. New capital cities are more a phenomenon of the post-independence era, but still there is at least one example of a capital city currently under development: Oyala in Guinea Equatorial. Political ‘security’ motives and oil revenues are the main drivers of this utopian city. Recently Egypt has also announced plans for a new administrative capital.

In the third left column new cities for residential housing for lower and middle classes (mostly satellite cities) are outlined, such as the cities related to the Chinese ‘oil for housing’ policy in Angola. These are often used for resettlement of city centre dwellers, who have been displaced as a result of inner-city restructuring, e.g. also in Addis Ababa. In practice, such satellite cities often end up being more middle-class-oriented (Benazeraf and Alves, 2014; Croese, 2012).

The next column concerns residential and commercial cities for middle and higher class inhabitants, hence similar to traditional gated communities. One example is La Cité du Fleuve in DRC, ‘an exclusive development situated on two islands reclaimed from sand-banks and swamp in the Congo River, adjacent to Kinshasa’ (La Cité du Fleuve, n.d.). The project is planned mostly as a residential enclave, with some commercial and retail aspects, focusing on a high ‘standard of living’.

In general, one new aspect of current new cities is their multi-purpose character, in which residential, commercial and speculative development is often combined with knowledge, technological or environmental innovation. This multifunctionalism reinforces the enclave self-contained character of new cities, and provides a rationale for privatised governance (Murray, 2015a). However, many new cities in reality end up being mostly consumptive or residential enclaves, reflecting gated communities, at least in their initial stage.

In the heart of the new cities phenomenon is the concept of technology, innovation and knowledge cities/hubs, such as Konza Technology City in Kenya and King Mohammed VI Green City in Morocco. While these cities are often built on a basis of residential and commercial development, they are meant to spearhead technological innovation and development at a national level, by attracting high-tech industries, start-ups, and universities, and providing national and global connectivity. Both residential/commercial and more technological innovative cities are often marketed as eco-cities (experimenting with environmental innovations and transitions towards low-carbon economies) or smart cities (infrastructurally wired cities operating through new ICT innovations); the reality of such claims in Africa is still to be awaited.

Finally, in column 6, are Special Economic Zones – free trade zones often related to industries and extractives, of which Africa has seen various, often strongly linked to Chinese investment. Some of these may also include a residential aspect. On the other hand, mining and agricultural enclave towns are also reappearing quickly throughout the continent, with new extractives booms taking place, for example in Kenya and Mozambique (Kirshner and Power, 2015). In some places these booms have led to broader new city development around existing cities in extractive industry regions (e.g. Takoradi in Ghana and Lubumbashi in DRC); while in other places new enclave towns are emerging or existing towns expanding, more directly related to the enabling of a transnational mining, oil or gas industry (e.g. Zambia and Mozambique).

As expected, a large part of the announced cities are still dreams in the
heads of their planners, and for a number of them it is very uncertain if they will ever be built. Others are in an early stage of development. The cities that are (partially) finished are often the more limited gated community-type developments.

In general, the types of cities where the state is highly involved are inner-city remakings, new administrative capitals, and lower-/middle-income housing projects. However, the private-public relations behind the projects are often complex.

In countries such as Rwanda and Kenya, new cities and inner-city remaking are a main part of their formal national economic strategies (Rwanda 2020 and Kenya 2030), which include becoming part of a global economy and leapfrogging towards high-tech and high-finance services development. In other cases, such as Mozambique, Angola and the DRC, the primary sector is very much a driver of national development, and new city development is much more interconnected to a transnational extractives sector. As Ferguson has noted (2006), the extractives sector in (post-conflict) settings such as Angola and DRC has created an extreme type of privatised governance, setting up a number of isolated high-securitised enclaves of private capital, while bypassing most of the rest of the country and the state. New cities in such contexts – whether directly or indirectly related to such extractive enclaves – can be seen as an extension of this extreme enclavic private governance model (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Hence the role of the state in dealing with new cities diverges, and some examples of the different modalities include strong centralised states (Rwanda, Ethiopia), more ‘enabling’ or ‘rolled back’ states competing over private investment (in some sense neoliberal: e.g. Kenya, Ghana, South Africa), to extremely absent and weak states with isolated enclaves of privatised governance (Angola, DRC).

The construction of new cities by itself is not new, but the scale, extent and the drivers behind such constructions are different than before, as is the current interest of international property companies (Lumumba, 2013), which may be related to capital’s post-crisis search for ‘spatial fixes’ (Harvey, 1985) and the general growth of African economies. New cities can therefore be described as large-scale private real estate investments that are largely built from scratch, and independent or self-sufficient, including a wide range of urban services (mixed use). New cities are converting and privatising land for residential, commercial and productive-technological uses for the high and middle class.

Financial trajectories

New cities in Africa are differentially linked to various parts of the globe, including particularly Asia, the Middle East and Euro-America (and connected within the African continent). These connections are reflected in the urban models and ideas used, as well as in their financial origins and contractors. This section provides an attempt to elicit the financial trajectories and complex financial capital flows leading to new cities (from very anecdotal evidence). We can identify different types of investments for new cities: (1) state-to-state funding, (2) hedge funds, banks, and other short- and long-term private investors, and (3) public–private partnerships.

An important player in various new city developments in Africa is state-to-state funding from China, mainly through the state-owned CITIC (China International Trust and Investment Corporation). China’s role is regularly highlighted: for example, the new capital city of Egypt will be built in alliance with China State Construction Engineering Corporation. Many of Angola’s new satellite towns (novas centralidades) are financed by
Chinese banks’ oil-backed loans, and constructed by Chinese state-backed construction firms such as CITIC Group (Benazeraf and Alves, 2014; Cain, 2014; Croese, 2012). The mode of finance of the projects is often obscure, however: Allan Cain observed the frequent use of public–private partnerships where members of the Angolan government have become shareholders, with private foreign firms carrying out the construction (2014). Another example is Shanghai Zendai, a Chinese private developer who will construct Modderfontein New City, in close proximity to Johannesburg (South Africa). With a total investment of US$5 billion (partly financed by the Bank of China) it is one of the largest foreign direct investments in South Africa. While other foreign states or donors are not widely seen as influencing new city development in Africa, there are some examples of involvement of Dutch development cooperation (Beira in Mozambique), the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (Konza Techno City in Kenya), and organisations such as UN-Habitat (the latter more indirectly in advisory roles).

In many other cases a multitude of (inter)national private investors is involved. A major player is the Russian based investment company Rendeavour. Rendeavour is the urban development branch of Renaissance Capital, a western-style, Russian-based, investment bank. Currently Rendevour has seven new city projects in Africa. In another case of international private investment, La Cité du Fleuve (DRC) is valued at US$1 billion and financed by a group of international private investors (Kachipande, 2013; SID, 2010). It is managed by Hawkwood properties, a fund manager with as majority shareholder Mukwa Investment (Zambia). Another example is Energyx Nigeria Ltd, specifically created to manage the solely privately funded Eko Atlantic City, by the Chagoury Group, a West Africa based company. Other partners participating in the project are the Bank of Nigeria, the First City Monument Bank and the Guaranty Trust Bank, a myriad of national and international private investments (Seymour, 2010). In other cases the financiers and developers are predominantly domestic: Waterfall City in Johannesburg is run by South African companies (Murray, 2015b), and Hope City in Ghana is financed for 30% by Ghanaian ICT company RLG Communications, while the rest is funded by other (private) investors and a stock-buying scheme (Kermeliotis, 2013). Kankugulu satellite city in Uganda is managed by domestic real estate developer Akright Projects (Kachipande, 2013). On the other hand, new cities in Sudan and Mauritania have clear connections with the Gulf States and other Islamic states, through their urban models, investors and contractors, which accept Islamic-based funding rules (Choplin and Franck, 2010).

On other occasions the investment is financed by the domestic state and managed as a public–private partnership, such as Konza Technology City in Kenya (Kachipande, 2013). Similarly the new capital city for Equatorial Guinea will be financed by state-funding through oil reserves (Sackur, 2012). Kigamboni City (Tanzania) is also a public–private partnership with the Kigamboni Development Agency (KDA) (Kachipande, 2013).

**New cities: Possible implications**

Since the down-turn of real estate markets in Western countries during, and in the aftermath of, the financial crisis of 2008, many investors have expressed interest in upcoming markets in Africa (Grant, 2015; Watson, 2013). Land and real estate are becoming new elements of speculation throughout the continent, as transnational capital finds ‘spatial fixes’ (Harvey, 1985). Incentives, such as free or cheap land and tax benefits are luring investors overseas to try their luck in Africa.
Hence it becomes essential to have a critical look at the implications of such investments at the local and national level. Given the lack of empirical evidence and actual experience with new cities in Africa, in the following paragraphs we aim to learn some preliminary lessons from similar cases and debates worldwide, such as those on gated communities and (peri-)urban land governance and displacement. Departing from the complexity of new cities as drawn in our typology (Table 1 and Figure 1), our aim is not to generalise about these cities’ implications across Africa, but rather to explore the diversity of new cities and possible consequences in light of previous experiences throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Exclusion, displacement and land governance

It is essential to look at new cities from the perspective of displacement and uprooting of established populations in the areas. Land in urban, peri-urban and rural areas for new city construction is often subject to complex, overlapping land tenure and use regimes and poorly functioning land governance systems. The extensive literature on (peri-)urban land governance and displacement has provided rich accounts of the implications and governance surrounding contemporary land acquisition and land use change in the Global South, and can provide some clues here.

In Africa land governance is often related to the dual system inherited from colonialism: a combination of formalised land rights in the central city (established to protect colonial elite interests) and customary or informal land rights in the peri-urban and rural realm, where urbanisation is largely informal and there is a complex mix between urban and rural livelihoods and governance (Pieterse and Parnell, 2014), including partial attempts at state recognition of customary land tenure, e.g. in the case of Ghana and Mozambique. In practice, the complexities of land governance outside city centres are such that speculation, de facto land buying and selling and obscure land transactions lead to very negative outcomes for the poor (particularly poor migrants or non-indigenous people) (Gough and Yankson, 2000, Pieterse and Parnell, 2014; Ubink, 2008).

Indeed, large-scale expulsion is becoming a global urban trend (Sassen, 2014). This is both true in countries with private land rights and/or dual private–customary systems, such as Ghana, and in cases where land is nationalised and property of the state (e.g. Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique) or where the state holds large powers of expropriation for public interest purposes (e.g. Rwanda). Indeed, losing land and housing through state expropriation is one of the main preoccupations of (peri-) urban dwellers nowadays (Goldman, 2011; Gough and Yankson, 2000). Eviction, resettlement and compensation processes are often insufficiently protective of the poor; and, in addition, the implementation and regulation leave much to be desired. This is frequently related to the speed of change (related to a sense of urgency created about ‘urban explosions’ and ‘crisis’ of African cities): new cities are likely to be fast-tracked and national laws and local regulations bypassed for the sake of time (Datta, 2015; Goldman, 2011), whereas resettlement and compensation procedures need time, dedication, and stakeholder participation (Cernea, 1997; Yntiso, 2008).

Without adequate compensation households lose a generational asset and their source of livelihood that cannot easily be replaced. It disrupts social networks and livelihood sources that are often used as survival strategies, which are difficult to regain even if there is compensation. Indeed, losing livelihoods, informal networks and location advantages is common in many places (Cernea, 1997; Nguyen Quang, 2015); and
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Purpose of cities</th>
<th>New capital cities</th>
<th>Lower/middle class housing</th>
<th>Higher class housing &amp; commercial development</th>
<th>Mixed use: technology/innovation/knowledge hubs including residential/commercial development</th>
<th>Special Economic Zones (mostly industrial)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spatial location and connection to existing city</td>
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<td>Often framed as ‘eco-cities’ and ‘smart cities’</td>
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<td>Independent city</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea: Oyala; Egypt: new capital</td>
<td>Morocco: King Mohamed VI Green City; Senegal: Diamniadio; Djibouti/Yemen: Al Noor; Nigeria: Anam City</td>
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<td>Satellite city</td>
<td>Angola (different cities): Nova Cidade de Kilamba &amp; many other satellite towns; Ethiopia: Addis Ababa</td>
<td>Ghana (Accra): Appolonia City; Kenya (Machakos): Machakos new city; Nigeria (Abuja): Jigna; Tanzania (Dar es Salaam): Kawe + 5 others; (Arusha): Safari City &amp; Usa River; Algeria (Constantine): El-Menia, (Hassi Messaoud): La Ville Nouvelle de Hassi Messaoud; Equatorial Guinea (Mikomeseng): new city; (Malabo): Sipopo</td>
<td>Morocco: Casablanca finance city; Egypt (Cairo): Al Tajamouat industrial City; Tunisia: Tunisian Economic City; Tanzania (Dar es Salaam): Kigamboni; Ghana (Accra): Hope City; (Takoradi): King City; South Africa (Cape Town): Wescape; (Johannesburg): Waterfall City, Steyn City; Modderfontein Chinese ‘smart city’; Kenya (Nairobi): Konza Technology City, Tatu City; Ethiopia (Addis Ababa): Huangjing City; DRC (Lubumbashi): Kiswishi; Luano City Business Park; Zambia (Lusaka): Roma Park; Namibia (Windhoek): Sungste; Nigeria (Lagos): Mitros City</td>
<td>Mauritius (Port Louis): Jinfie; South Africa (Johannesburg): Lanseria Airport City/Cradle City; Nigeria: Lagos Free Trade Zone; Lekki Free Zone; Zambia (Lusaka): Lusaka Subzone</td>
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<td>City within existing city/suburb</td>
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<td>(Many examples possible)</td>
<td>DRC (Kinshasa): La Cite du Fleuve; Kenya (Nairobi): Migaa, Thika Greens, Fourways junction, Flame tree, Oakfield Valley, Jacaranda Gardens; Kenya (Eldoret): Sergoit; Uganda (Kampala): Kankugulu, Palm Villas, gated comm. near Namugongo, gated comm. near Naguru; Mauritania: Nouakchott New Town, Socogim Beach, Sukuk; Congo-Brazzaville: Kintele Rives du Congo; Nigeria (Lagos): Eko Atlantic; Sudan (Khartoum): Al Mogran Development Project, Medinat Al-Nour, Tuti Island development</td>
<td>Nigeria (Lagos): Eko Atlantic; Sudan (Khartoum): Al Mogran Development Project, Medinat Al-Nour, Tuti Island development</td>
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<td>Total restructuring existing city</td>
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<td>Ethiopia: Addis Ababa restructuring; Angola: Luanda restructuring</td>
<td>Rwanda: Kigali 2020 inner city restructuring; Mozambique: Beira restructuring</td>
<td>Mozambique, Palma Development (Port); towns related to mining and oil extraction e.g. in Zambia</td>
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Notes: Bold font = built/at least some elements operational; regular font = planned/announced city.
food insecurity increases have been reported, e.g. in Ethiopia (Yntiso, 2008). In Kinshasa, La Cité du Fleuve puts urban farmers and fishermen at risk of losing livelihoods (De Boeck, 2011), and the same risk is present in Khartoum with its newly planned developments (Choplin and Franck, 2010; Zoomers et al., 2017). Where agricultural areas are transformed into urban real estate, these issues are particularly pressing (Goldman, 2011): even if peri-urban farmers could benefit from new opportunities of selling produce, the little land they are often left with frequently makes this impossible (Narain, 2009). New city building runs the risk of displacing the most mobile and flexible urban livelihoods in extremely poor cities such as Kinshasa (De Boeck, 2014). Naturally, the extent of displacement is highly variable, as in some cases land is bought from large private landholdings, hence limiting the extent of displacement (e.g. Tatu City near Nairobi, Waterfall City near Johannesburg).
Furthermore, we should also look beyond direct land loss and displacement and pay attention to broader land-based exclusion processes and enclosure of the commons, which are recognised as main problems in the current urbanising world. Indeed, as developers and speculators are creating new urban space and monopolising space, land is increasingly privatised and commoditised worldwide. Gentrification and land price increases can work to exclude the poor in more indirect ways (van Noorloos, 2014; van Noorloos and Steel, 2016) and drive market-driven evictions and displacements (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Therefore, securing effective, formalised and transparent land rights may not always be a solution and may even lead to further land commodification (Zoomers, 2010).

**Socio-spatial segregation and gated communities**

New cities are likely to exacerbate socio-spatial segregation in different ways. Debates on gated communities may to this extent be insightful. As outlined above, although new cities in Africa often promote themselves as independent mixed-use enclaves, many of them (so far) seem to offer little more than residential and commercial enclaves for the rich. Similar to gated communities, they are often characterised by their supply-driven and consumption-oriented character; and by gatedness, security and exclusion. What we observe are fortified enclaves (Caldeira, 1996) in the form of new cities where certain population groups form communities based on status and wealth, fencing themselves off with walls and private security, while enjoying the provision of a large variety of services on-site.

If new cities will proliferate like gated communities, this may lead to (1) social-spatial segregation between the population of the new city and the existent urban area and (2) the clustering of income groups together, based on wealth and status, which diminishes the possibility of meaningful social interaction, public debate (social contract) and possibly social upward mobility through neighbourhood effects.

From examples about social-spatial segregation from Latin America we know that where gated communities, shopping malls and the like have come to form basic elements of the urban fabric, the livability of cities is increasingly threatened, as urban sprawl by such speculative investment ‘eats up’ rural natural areas, and socio-spatial segregation decreases urban public life (Klaufus, 2010). Developer-planned communities tend to emerge in the wider context of weak urban planning (Klaufus, 2010; Thuillier, 2005). The multiplication of gated communities has often been supply-driven, promoted by extensive professional real estate and marketing industries; periodic booms lead to great oversupply (Morange et al., 2012; van Noorloos, 2014). While the phenomenon of gated communities has been partly democratised in some countries (e.g. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil) with middle-income groups also increasingly buying in, it is clear that an urban planning based on private-developed gated communities will leave out large groups of urban poor. In African cities, generally, marketing claims of high middle-class growth cannot hide the fact that the poor make up the large majority of urban inhabitants, and they are not part of new cities’ target audience.

In theory what makes some current new city plans different from gated communities – particularly the type mentioned under ‘Technology/innovation/knowledge hubs (including residential/commercial development)’ in Table 1 – is their productive aspect: rather than only focusing on residential and consumptive aspects, cities such as Konza Technology City in Kenya also aim to integrate industrial/technological production...
functions and spur technological innovation. If such functions indeed materialise, much more extensive development effects could potentially be generated (on the positive side), while on the other hand these cities would possibly start functioning as real enclavic privatised cities (Murray, 2015a, 2015b). However, developing the consumptive and residential aspects of such cities often presents the least risk and more immediate returns. Indeed, housing, land selling and some commercial activities are often the only elements established in new cities so far (see for example Moser et al., 2015 on KAEC in Saudi Arabia; and Sutton and Fahmi, 2001 on Egypt’s satellite cities), and there is a danger of never advancing to a more productive stage.

Urban fragmentation, democratic governance and spatial justice

Besides socio-spatial segregation, the fragmentation of cities and regions in terms of governance and accountability warrants further attention (see Graham and Marvin, 2001), also in terms of public spending and infrastructural justice. For example, top-down planned new cities may lead to a devaluation of planning instruments and a lack of citizen engagement and public participation in urban planning (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015).

New city plans vary in their type of connection to national laws and urban regulations, and their reliance on their own rules: US economist Paul Romer’s brainchild Charter Cities (not yet literally implemented in Africa) advocates the idea of politically autonomous new cities which operate outside the national legal framework. One of the dangers of new cities is thus for private city-states to emerge that are entirely removed from public accountability (Murray, 2015a, 2015b; Watson, 2013). Indeed, in Waterfall City near Johannesburg, private urban management companies replace legitimate authorities with extensive regulatory and land-use regimes (Murray, 2015b).

Interestingly, as Bhan (2014) states, new city plans often make reference to cities such as Dubai, Singapore and cities in China, not only because of envisaged physical similarities, but also in terms of the rationality and semi-authoritarian governance: developers aim for a ‘controlled and orderly city’, free from the messiness of democratic politics (Bhan, 2014; see also Cirolia, 2014). Indeed, new cities are frequently de facto governed by corporate executives; these cities are products that need to be marketed. Similarities are visible with the de facto administration of gated communities: research in Latin America indicates that gated communities tend to create new extra-territorial spaces (Coy and Pöhler, 2002) which are inserted into weak governance structures. Such characteristics are not generalisable to all new cities (see Table 1): naturally, new capital cities and lower-middle class housing projects tend to rely more on state governance.

New cities can thus accrue in a form of splintered urbanism (Graham and Marvin, 2001) where the new city areas are prioritised in terms of services over existent urban fabrics (Cain, 2014; Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015; Murray, 2015a, 2015b; Watson, 2013). The outflow of elites from existing cities might lead to democratic and fiscal deficits, particularly if taxes are paid in a new or different administrative area; this can burden remaining urban dwellers with higher tax rates (Cirolia, 2014). All this will, however, depend on important governance questions such as which entities have administrative responsibilities for what aspects of the new cities; how is tax collected and redistributed; how are existing urban (or rural) governments involved in land governance and urban planning related to new cities; at
which scale level does governance take place; etc. There is little experience with these governance questions so far.

Some consider privately financed new cities to be beneficial partnerships in cases where the state lacks funding for (high-end) housing development. Indeed, this may prevent a situation where the state diverts its funding to new cities rather than providing for the majority of urban poor in existing cities, as was the case in many postcolonial state-planned new cities (Cain, 2014; Scott, 1998). However, various examples show that the above assumption about ‘liberating’ public funding can be flawed: often times public funding needs to step in when financial problems emerge for new cities, and/or hidden subsidies are granted through the provision of cheap land, surrounding infrastructure and the like. Angola’s novas centralidades exemplify both these problems (Cain, 2014); when Kilamba Kiaxi turned out to be unaffordable for many households, the state was obliged to step in and heavily subsidise the housing through a ‘rent-to-purchase’ scheme to save the project. In other cases, such as WesCape (South Africa) similar state involvement is expected (Cirolia, 2014). It is problematic that the limited public resources available in many African cities could divert towards the construction and servicing of middle and higher class-oriented new cities rather than meeting the basic needs of urban dwellers elsewhere. As such, new cities can lead to new forms of spatial injustice.

Discussion and conclusion

In this paper we made a first attempt at a typology of new cities in Africa, which serves to emphasise the heterogeneous character of the phenomenon. The typology shows a high diversity of new city projects across the continent. They differ in terms of their main purpose; spatial insertion/relation to existing cities; stage; main driving actors and connections to different parts of the world. Many of the projects are still in the planning or starting phase (or even stalled), and the ones that do exist are mainly consumptive gated community type of suburban projects, large-scale inner-city restructurings and state-planned residential satellite cities that were partly planned to resettle inner-city inhabitants displaced by these restructurings. Hence entirely newly planned cities with important productive (technological innovation) elements are often still dreams for the future or in a very initial phase.

It seems clear that parts of Africa have indeed been created as new frontiers for the displacement of global investment capital (see Goldman, 2011; Sheppard et al., 2015). Yet new city projects are diverse and localised: they are inserted into pre-existing yet dynamic political economies and societies at multiple scales. Although mostly private-led projects, they are often part and parcel of national economic development strategies, while others are more reminiscent of ‘globe-hopping’ privatised enclaves related to the extractive industries (Ferguson, 2006). Hence some states enact new cities themselves in a top-down manner, whilst others act in neoliberal enabling ways to compete for private investment, and others completely leave governance to the private sector without capacity for control. However, one general point is that strong entrepreneurial and developmental states are less common than in Asia, where speculative urbanism and new cities are often connected to such states. Parnell and Robinson state that:

[...] the creation of a whole new gated city outside of Luanda, Angola, which concentrates services for the wealthy few and excludes the poor majority, is not analogous to the gated communities that emerge from the neoliberal retreat of the state as in the U.S. or Dubai ..., but may reflect the new urban form of an absent and utterly incapacitated state that
arises out of different circumstances, ideologies, and processes than those that gave rise to urban neoliberalism. (Parnell and Robinson, 2012: 601)

When we look at new cities across the spectrum, we would argue that they can be called neoliberal to some extent and in some contexts: they can mostly be traced in some way to global worlding strategies and global capital seeking outlets and can in that way be called neoliberal. On the other hand, they touch ground in a diversity of contexts and with a diversity of states and other actors involved, which cannot be generalised as neoliberal. While some ‘new cities’ can be considered a really new urban form in a certain context, there are many that in reality do not differ that much from gated communities, Special Economic Zones and the like.

The characterisation of new cities and the actors and finance involved subsequently allowed us to learn lessons from long-standing debates on new cities, gated communities, and (peri-)urban land governance and displacement. Given the need to expand our urban imaginations beyond the West and ‘theorize from the South’ (Bunnell et al., 2012; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson and Roy, 2016), we have particularly attempted to understand the variety of African experiences by engaging with literature and debates from Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. We argue that the de facto consumptive and supply-driven character of many new city projects (resembling gated communities for middle and higher classes), their insertion into complex ‘rurban’ spaces with even more complex land governance arrangements, and their tendency to implement post-democratic private-sector-driven governance (but with public funding as a back-up) will make them at best unsuitable for solving any of the main urban problems Africa is facing, and at worst they will increase expulsions and enclosures of the poor, public funding injustice and socio-spatial segregation and fragmentation.

Indeed, Africa’s very necessary urban innovations will not come from new cities; these are too much based on assumptions about urbanisation deriving from other parts of the world. Traditional western industrialising urbanisation accompanied by the rise of middle classes is hardly happening in much of Africa. Rather, Africa’s urbanisation (with the risk of generalising) is characterised by a lack of productive industrialisation and formal economic opportunities in cities; a large informal and survival-oriented economic activity; and important remaining rural–urban connections (Pieterse and Parnell, 2014; Turok and McGranahan, 2013). Current urban investments build on existing weaknesses rather than transforming them; they offer mostly opportunities for speculation and quick profit to be made from residential and commercial development, thereby reinforcing the externally dependent character of urbanisation. So new cities are mainly speculative consumption-oriented developments that are often also meant to exercise symbolic global power as ‘world class cities’ (Roy and Ong, 2011; Watson, 2013). Such image building alone however, is very unlikely to bring badly needed wider productive development, and may rather lead to a race to the bottom to attract investment.

Since the effects of new cities in Africa will depend on the exact governance arrangements involved, further empirical research on governance is needed. Besides delving into the important roles of private sector and civil society, we need to unpack the state: in a more nuanced view of the state’s actions and responsibilities, we can see how the complex interaction between informal and formal institutions, power dynamics (Goodfellow, 2014), and the complexity of state actors with different aims, views and interests, create the environment
for new cities as well as influence their diverse consequences. Furthermore, the specific characteristics and consequences of new cities also stem from the diverse trans-local influences, ideas and models used to inspire Africa’s new cities. Indeed, further research should follow these trans-local connections more closely in order to allow for a more relational and heterogeneous view of new cities (van Noorloos and Leung, 2017).

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Notes

1. Deborah Potts reminds us to take these numbers with some caution: data used are frequently erroneous, and urban growth is often not exceeding rural growth (Potts, 2012). Despite great regional varieties, absolute urban population growth in Africa is still viewed as one of the main challenges of 21st century urbanisation.

2. We are aware that ‘Africa’ can hardly be taken as a unit of analysis, let alone seen as a homogeneous entity. Yet we do think it is interesting to start a very exploratory comparison, since new city building has recently gained much ground all over the African continent. This is informed by local analyses of specific new cities, and should be viewed as a first starting point.

3. We are aware that each terminology comes with its own limitations, and we prefer to use the term ‘new cities’ in order to link up to recent academic debates, even if we are aware that ‘new cities’ is also a marketing term used by their own promoters. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of the term ‘new cities’ in light of recent debates on what constitutes a city (e.g. Brenner, 2013) seems appropriate here. We can view new cities as part of increasingly differentiated, polycentric, complex geographies of urbanisation: new, increasingly large-scale morphologies that perforate, crosscut and ultimately explode the erstwhile urban/rural divide (Brenner, 2013). Hence they are often part of extensive growing urban mega-regions, or they attempt to import urban lifestyles in previously not so urban areas. We scrutinise the developers’ world city aspirations and their self-proclaimed power to shape anything that resembles a traditional city or represents urbanity (Sassen, 2015).

4. It also draws ideas from former empirical work by the authors, mostly on urban redevelopment and resettlement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

5. It is impossible to give an exhaustive overview, given the constantly changing character of urban development, and the high number of for example gated communities. Our selection is probably slightly biased towards the largest and most visible examples. We restrict our analysis to the newer developments, i.e. from c. 2000 onwards.

6. Yet Angola’s novas centralidades in themselves are not particularly part of such typical enclave governance; they emerged from public–private governance with Chinese oil-backed finance.

7. Tatu City (Kenya), Appolonia (Ghana), King City (Ghana), Lekki (Nigeria), Jigna (Nigeria), Roma Park (Zambia) and Kiswishi (DRC).

8. Rendeavour has been haunted by financial and management problems in the past years, e.g. in Tatu City where the company collaborated with many local developers in a very complex shareholder arrangement. It is currently unclear to what extent the company will continue its investments.

9. At least in the context of Latin America, gated community is the term used for many types of residential-commercial developments, ranging from common smaller residential projects to very large ones that include a wide variety of private services and function as integrated privatised cities (e.g. Nordelta in Argentina: see Janoschka, 2003). Given such conceptualisations, differentiating
new cities from gated communities is not always straightforward: the boundaries between them are quite blurred in practice.

References


